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“I Can’t Afford to Leave Him” Divorcing a 
Spouse with Superior Financial Resources 
By Cyn Haueter 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Current research shows that approximately half of all marriages will 
end in divorce within twenty years.1  People divorce for a variety of reasons, 
ranging from the benign to the scandalous, but adoption of no-fault divorce 
laws in all fifty states indicates the government-recognized importance of 
the ability to leave an unhappy marriage.2  Along with rising divorce rates, 
the past few decades have seen an increase in the cost of contested 
divorces,3 as well as concerns over how married individuals without 
independent means can afford them.  
Part II of this note examines the social and economic impact of divorce 
on women, who are more likely to be the more economically disadvantaged 
partners in heterosexual marriages,4 thus demonstrating the importance of 
access to legal representation in marital dissolutions.  Part III discusses the 
issues that spouses lacking financial resources face in hiring a lawyer for 
divorce proceedings.  Part IV offers background on court-mandated fee 
shifting and pendente lite attorney’s fees in particular.  Part V compares the 
statutes and practices of pendente lite fee shifting in California, a 
community property state, and New York, an equitable distribution state. 
Finally, Part VI concludes this note with suggestions on how states might 
improve their statutes in the interest of fairness and justice.  
 
 1. Casey E. Copen et al., First Marriages in the United States: Data from the 2006-
2010 National Survey of Family Growth, 49 NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS REPORT 1, 7 
(2012) (This average divorce rate is nearly identical to divorce rates calculated in the 1970s).   
 2. Lauren Guidice, Note, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault in a No-Fault System, 
19 J.L. & POL’Y 787, 788 (2011). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. This note focuses primarily on heterosexual marriages where the husband is the 
primary breadwinner, controls the couple’s liquid assets, or is otherwise in a financially 
advantageous position to wife.  This is not intended to marginalize LGBTQ marriages, but 
rather reflects the currently available academic research and case law.  This note also does 
not consider the impact of premarital or post-marital agreements on divorce legal fees.   
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II. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DIVORCE 
In heterosexual marriages, many women have limited access to 
financial resources at the point of dissolution or divorce. In 2017, 
approximately half of married women worked outside the home.5  Women 
who do work earn less than their male counterparts of comparable 
experience and education,6 and husbands out-earn their wives in over two-
thirds of marriages.7  This disparity in pay is often attributed to social and 
cultural bias, as well as time spent on domestic responsibilities.8 Women 
have fewer opportunities to accrue wealth because they generally perform 
more of the childrearing and homemaking duties than their partners, 
regardless of who works outside the home.9  Reduced earning capacity, 
combined with the fact that most married people have joint bank accounts,10 
creates a situation where women are at greater risk of financial abuse during 
marriage or at the outset of divorce.11  As a result, a disproportionate 
percentage of women may lack the capital to hire a competent lawyer to 
initiate or defend a divorce action. 
 
 5. Employment Characteristics – Families, BUREAU OF LABOR AND STATICS (April 19, 
2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.htm [https://perma.cc/W3VP-9E64].  For 
further research on parental workforce participation, see Gretchen Livingston, Stay-at-
Home Moms and Dads Account for About One-in-Five U.S. Parents, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/24/stay-at-home-
moms-and-dads-account-for-about-one-in-five-u-s-parents/ [https://perma.cc.UM 3Z-
SQ5Q], and Joseph Chamie, Despite Growing Gender Equality, More Women Stay at Home 
than Men, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ more-
women-stay-home-men [https://perma.cc/2ZM6-UJ23]. 
 6. Pay Equity and Discrimination, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2019), https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-education-economic-change 
/pay-equity-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/EGB7-P5A4]. 
 7. Kim Parker and Renee Stepler, Americans See Men as the Financial Providers, 
Even as Women’s Contributions Grow, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 20, 2017) 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/20/americans-see-men-as-the-financial-
providers-even-as-womens-contributions-grow/ [https://perma.cc/G8E4-UE8U]. 
 8. Joseph Chamie, Women More Educated Than Men But Still Paid Less, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Mar. 6, 2014), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/women-more-edu 
cated-men-still-paid-less [https://perma.cc/UBS5-3Q4V].  
 9. Chore Wars: Men, Women and Housework, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, 
https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_images.jsp?cntn_id=111458 [https://perma.cc/LP54-
V5YD]; see generally Rebecca M. Horne et al., Time, Money, or Gender? Predictors of the 
Division of Household Labour Across Life Stages, 78 SEX ROLES 731, 739 (2018).  
 10. Fenaba R. Addo and Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship 
Quality in Low-Income Couples, 54 FAM RELAT. 408, 410 (2010); Andrew Plepler, Note, 
2018 Better Money Habits Millennial Report, BANK OF AMERICA 1, 8 (2018), https:// 
bettermoneyhabits.bankofamerica.com/content/dam/bmh/pdf/ar6vnln9-boa-bmh-millenn 
ial-report-winter-2018-final2.pdf. 
 11. See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Power in the Age of In/Equality: Economic Abuse, 
Masculinities, and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 51 AKRON L. REV. 323 (2017). 
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Women, especially those with children, experience disproportionately 
negative financial outcomes from divorces.12  Divorce is a significant factor 
in why families descend into poverty.13  Women perform the majority of 
the domestic labor both before and after divorce, which is not fully valued 
in settlement proceedings.14  They are also more likely to retain primary 
custody of their children after a divorce.15  Those who work after divorce 
are still impacted by pay disparity,16 and often do not earn at their full 
capacity due to increased responsibilities as a single parent. 17  Women who 
have joint custody with the children’s father also experience a negative 
economic and professional impact.18  Men, on the other hand, may realize 
a financial benefit to divorce.19  Even when ordered to pay divorce 
settlement or child support, they are less encumbered with childcare and 
chores, which allows them to continue to work at their current earning 
potential.20  This disparity between partners after divorce is a life-changing 
outcome for many women.  
Courts and commentators have recognized the importance of equal 
access to legal representation in dissolution proceedings.21  Studies indicate 
that people who receive legal assistance, whether from a legal clinic or 
attorney, are more likely to be “satisfied with the court system and the 
outcome than those who did not.”22  This is because lawyers are 
experienced at navigating the court system, negotiating with opposing 
counsel, and devising legal strategies to maximize the odds of receiving a 
satisfactory outcome.  For divorce proceedings in particular, an 
experienced attorney can be crucial in equitable settlements and custody 
arrangements, thus mitigating the damage that many women without 
adequate representation or guidance experience.23  In addition to individual 
 
 12. Stanford L. Bracer, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: 
Vanishing Small? 33 FAM. L.Q. 111, 113 (1999); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Deborah Small, 
Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 
LAW AND INEQUALITY 109, 109 (2008). 
 13. Monica A. Fennell, Using State Legal Needs Studies to Increase Access to Justice 
for Low-Income Families, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 619, 622 (2010). 
 14. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 
71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 753 (1993); Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 12, at 128–29. 
 15. Matthew D. Bramlett and William D. Mosher, First Marriage Dissolution, 
Divorce, and Remarriage: United States, 323 ADVANCE DATA 1, 2 (2001). 
 16. Pay Equity and Discrimination, supra note 6. 
 17. Id.; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 12, at 129. 
 18. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 12, at 129. 
 19. Bramlett, supra note 15. 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Kingston White, A Call for Regulating Third-Party Divorce Litigation 
Funding, 13 J.L. FAM. STUD. 395 (2011); Bibeane Metsch-Garcia, Eliminating Financiers 
from the Equation: A Call for Court-Mandated Fee Shifting in Divorces, 113 MICH. L. REV. 
1271 (2015).  
 22. Fennell, supra note 13, at 619. 
 23. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 12; Bramlett, supra note15.  
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outcomes, access to effective counsel also has the potential to set beneficial 
precedent and change laws, which impacts future divorce proceedings.24  
Despite the importance of effective counsel, court-appointed attorneys are 
generally not available for divorces, leaving parties responsible for their 
own representation.25  
III.  HIRING AND PAYING A LAWYER 
Spouses who lack liquid assets or other financial resources have limited 
options and face obstacles in securing divorce attorneys. Legal costs vary 
by region and complexity of the case.  An average mediated divorce costs 
approximately $5,000, while the average litigated divorce can range 
between $15,000 and $30,000.26  These costs can increase drastically when 
the divorce is contentious or the marital assets are valuable.27 The Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which are adopted in some form by many 
jurisdictions, forbid attorneys from accepting contingency fees in domestic 
relation matters which result in alimony, support, or other property 
settlements.28  Attorneys are also specifically precluded from taking 
contingency fees in divorce cases.29  The purpose of this is to ensure that 
attorneys do not over-litigate a family matter in order to receive a larger 
settlement for their client and therefore a larger fee for themselves.  Since 
contingency fees are not available, if a spouse cannot afford an attorney at 
cost the alternatives are generally limited to pro-bono legal services, pro se 
representation, or seeking alternative means to pay the cost of attorney’s 
fees.  Insufficient legal representation can lead to unfavorable divorce 
settlements, which then contributes to the continued financial inequality in 
divorced couples.  
 
 24. See Breitbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74 (2007).  The contentious divorce 
proceedings between Stacey Breitbart-Napp and David Napp inspired the Arizona 
legislature to change A.R.S. § 25-324 (LexisNexis 2010) to award a spouse attorney costs 
and fees when the other spouse files a petition for attorney fees in bad faith.  Ms. Breitbart-
Napp went on to found Balance Point Funding, LLC, a divorce financing firm. Why Balance 
Point Was Founded, BALANCE POINT FUNDING, LLC., http://www.balancepointfunding. 
com/our-story.html [https://perma.cc/6NUB-9NH5]. 
 25. See generally Darrin Hurwitz and Sarah K. Eddy, Thirty-First Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure, 90 GEO. L.J. 1579; Bruce Andrew Green, Court Appointment of 
Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 
COL. L. REV. 366 (1981); 3 CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.01; 32 A.L.R.5th 31. 
 26. Leah Hoffman, To Have and To Hold, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2006), https://www. 
forbes.com/2005/02/24/cx_lh_0224legaldivorce.html#79402e4215f9 [https://perma.cc/7P 
62-35WU]. 
 27. Johnson v. Chapin, 12 N.Y.3d 461, 467 (2009) (Finding that the trial court was 
reasonable in awarding the wife $100,000 in counsel fees in light of the husband’s estimated 
$2,000,000 annual income compared to the wife’s limited assets.). 
 28. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2019) [https:// 
perma.cc/QA7D-5CH7]. 
 29. Id.  
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A. Pro Bono and Low-Cost Legal Representation 
Pro bono representation and other low-cost legal services are not a 
viable option in most divorces.30  Family law matters like divorce and child 
custody are one of the primary legal needs of low-income people.31  State 
reports show these needs are not adequately met by low-cost resources.32  
Legal clinics and pro bono attorneys have limited capacity because they 
often lack financial resources and personnel.33  Potential clients can face 
long delays while waiting for legal assistance.34  Many organizations that 
provide free services have qualification thresholds tied to the United States 
poverty rate that review a client’s income and assets to determine 
qualification.35  These thresholds generally disqualify spouses who are not 
impoverished but who nonetheless cannot sustain a private legal action.  
Also, low-cost or fixed-rate divorce attorneys often require payment at the 
time of service.36  While the amounts owed may be lower than traditional 
hourly rates, it can still be an insurmountable barrier for those with limited 
funds.  Low-cost legal options are an important resource, but the limitations 
of such programs can mean that they are unlikely to fully meet the needs of 
economically disadvantaged spouses.  
B. Paying for Divorce with Loans 
When faced with the prospect of self-representation in divorce, 
particularly when the opposing party has hired counsel, a spouse without 
liquid assets may turn to a variety of resources to pay for a lawyer.  Personal 
loans from banks, credit unions, or online lenders are common options,37 as 
are informal loans from friends and family.38  The divorce financing 
industry emerged in the last decade as a controversial means for cash-
 
 30. See generally Fennell, supra note 13.  
 31. Id. at 621. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 624. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Frequently Asked Questions, BAY AREA LEGAL AID (last accessed March 22, 2019), 
https://baylegal.org/get-help/appointment-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/ZT82-YRCT]; Client 
Intake Form, PRO BONO PROJECT, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51ba1be6e4 
b0306d8e877d46/t/59720c7c86e6c056871dc051/1500646524740/**EDITABLE+Intake+
Form.pdf [https://perma.cc/43F8-TEZS]; Frequently Asked Questions, LEGAL AID SOCIETY 
OF SOUTHWEST OHIO, LLC (last visited Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.lascinti.org/get-
help/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/9MSJ-5ZRN]. 
 36. Fixed Fee Divorce, MY COLLABORATIVE TEAM, https://www.mycolla 
borativeteam.com/fixed-fee-divorce/ [https://perma.cc/ZX8A-DYKS]; Fees and Services, 
FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER [https://perma.cc/E67T-TNZC]. 
 37. Steve Nicastro, Where to Get a Personal Loan, NERDWALLET, (Mar. 19, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2JBK-MSS7]. 
 38. Why Balance Point Was Founded, BALANCE POINT FUNDING, LLC, http://www. 
balancepointfunding.com/our-story.html [https://perma.cc/6NUB-9NH5]. 
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strapped spouses to fund divorce proceedings.39  Despite the plethora of 
apparent options, the reality of securing funds for divorce is still an obstacle 
for many.  
Personal loans from financial institutions are a well-known option for 
people who need capital. Divorcing spouses can apply at traditional 
banks,40 credit unions,41 or through online financiers.42  These options all 
require credit checks, which determine the monthly payments, interest 
rates, and eligibility.43  It is unclear how the other spouse’s control of 
marital assets may impact the loan process.  Economically disadvantaged 
spouses without credit or with low credit scores face high interest and 
payments, or even denial of the loan.  Even those who are able to get 
personal loans may struggle with the monthly loan payment on top of their 
ordinary living expenses – now magnified by the sudden removal of the 
other spouse’s income.44  In addition to the general financial difficulties 
associated with receiving and repaying a loan, the compounding costs of 
divorce on top of living expenses is a prime example of why many divorced 
women and children are at risk of poverty.45   
Another option for financing a divorce is to solicit contributions from 
family and friends.46  The traditional method for this is to directly request 
contributions from personal connections.  However, online platforms for 
requesting donations from friends and strangers alike for a multitude of 
causes have developed over the past decade.47  Requests for divorce 
donations can be found on popular crowdfunding websites like 
GoFundMe.48  In 2016, the platform PlumFund, which provides 
crowdfunding registries for weddings, retirement, and baby showers,49  
 
 39. See White, supra note 21. 
 40. Personal Loans, WELLS FARGO BANK, https://www.wellsfargo.com/personal-
credit/personal-loan/ [https://perma.cc/9GCP-VKGX].  
 41. Personal Loans, UNIFY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, https://www.unifyfcu.com/ 
personal-loans [https://perma.cc/7YQ3-5AGD]; Personal Loans, ALLIANT CREDIT UNION, 
https://www.alliantcreditunion.org/borrow/get-a-credit-union-personal-loan [https://perma. 
cc/QW3K-8CLD].  
 42. Personal Loans, SOCIAL FINANCE, INC., https://www.sofi.com/personal-loans/ 
[https://perma.cc/48FA-B6NB]. 
 43. Nicastro, supra note 37. 
 44. Brett R. Turner, Division of Debts Upon Divorce, 20(6) EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
J. 61, 66 (2003). 
 45. Fennell, supra note 13, at 622. 
 46. Why Balance Point Was Founded, supra note 38.  
 47. Devin Thorpe, What is Crowdfunding?, FORBES (June 25, 2018), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2018/06/25/what-is-crowdfunding/#46e3c12e65c5 [https://pe 
rma.cc/4NCY-U3MK]. 
 48. Koharik’s Divorce, GOFUNDME.COM, Dec. 5, 2018 [https://perma.cc/JLB2-JFFQ]; 
Help for Divorce, GOFUNDME.COM, Jan. 12, 2019 [https://perma.cc/QBG6-KDZ5]; 
JennyAnn’s Divorce Lawyer Fund, GOFUNDME.COM, May 26, 2018 [https:// 
perma.cc/DV2X-SLQ9].  
 49. Id.  
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added a Divorce Registry to its website.50  This service allowed users to 
create a wish list for contributions of goods, cash, and legal fees.51  
However, relying on donations to pay for a divorce attorney is a risky 
endeavor.  It requires either that personal connections are willing and able 
to contribute, or that strangers on the internet are sufficiently moved by the 
cause to donate.  Relying on the purported generosity of strangers should 
be a last-ditch effort to acquire the necessary divorce financing, as it is not 
a consistent or reliable option. 
C. Divorce Funding 
Along with crowdfunding, the past decade has seen the rise—and fall—
of divorce funding firms in the United States.  Sometimes referred to as 
“divorce loans,” these companies finance the economically disadvantaged 
spouse in a process that is more analogous to investing than to traditional 
loans.52  These companies evaluate the potential divorce settlement that the 
client spouse could receive with a well-funded legal team, then decide 
whether to advance legal fees and living expenses.53  The companies are 
then repaid with interest out of the divorce proceeds.54   
Divorce financing is not accessible to the majority of economically 
disadvantaged spouses, as the business model requires high-value 
settlements.  In 2018, the median household income in the United States 
was $61,937.55 The criteria that Balance Point Funding, LLC considered in 
evaluating potential clients were whether marital assets exceeded 
$2,000,000, whether the client signed a premarital or postmarital 
agreement, and whether the necessary divorce expenses exceeded 
$200,000.56  Other divorce funding companies, such as BBL Churchill and 
New Chapter Capital, did not disclose their requirements, but the client 
 
 50. Maria Carter, The Latest Trend in Crowdfunding is the ‘Divorce Registry’, 
WOMEN’S DAY (May 3, 2016), https://www.womansday.com/relationships/dating-marri 
age/a54762/crowdfund-divorce/ [https://perma.cc/7RVU-SVLP]; Zephyr Hill, Did You 
Know You Can Crowdfund Your Divorce? DIVORCE MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2016), https:/ 
/www.divorcemag.com/blog/did-you-know-you-can-crowdfund-your-divorce [https://per 
ma.cc/7HZX-8X8E]; Rachel Cao, On Plumfund, you can crowdfund your honeymoon . . . 
and your divorce, CNBC (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/on-plumfund-
you-can-crowdfund-your-honeymoon-and-your-divorce.html [https://perma.cc/K39N-
CAWT]. 
 51. Divorce Registry, PLUMFUND, https://www.plumfund.com/divorce-registry/ 
[https://perma.cc/8X5Z-ECUW]. 
 52. White, supra note 21, at 396; Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21, at 1272. 
 53. White, supra note 21, at 400; Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21, at 1277. 
 54. White, supra note 21, at 399; Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21, at 1274.  
 55. Gloria G. Guzman, Household Income: 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/acs/acsbr18-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A8GV-56FX]. 
 56. For Attorneys, BALANCE POINT FUNDING, LLC, http://www.balancepointfund 
ing.com/for-attorneys.html [https://perma.cc/S2NC-5TCL]. 
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testimonials shared with the press indicate similarly lofty standards which 
most couples would not be able to meet.57  
The emergence of third-party divorce funding was met by concerned 
reactions from legal professionals.  The practice appeared to be 
circumventing the ethical rules forbidding contingency fees in divorces.58  
While divorce funders are not legal entities and therefore are not bound by 
the same ethical rules as attorneys, the same concerns that led to the ban on 
attorneys accepting contingency fees for divorce matters are still relevant.  
The practice runs the risk of financiers improperly influencing the divorce 
proceedings to negotiate a larger settlement, even if contrary to the wishes 
of their client.59  There are also concerns that the level of involvement of 
the divorce funding companies violates attorney-client privilege.  While a 
traditional loan simply requires that the borrower make the monthly loan 
payments on time, some divorce funding companies became more involved 
in the cases they financed.60  BBL Churchill required clients to allow their 
attorneys to disclose “all reasonable information required in order to assess 
this application.”61  Balance Point Funding used in-house investigators to 
locate potential marital assets and provided a case manager for each 
client.62  Balance Point Funding also asserted that a “Beverly Hills lawyer” 
had confirmed that its business practices met “the ethical standards by 
which lawyers are bound.”63  However, these assurances did not hold up 
when challenged.  A New York court held that the communications 
between Balance Point Funding and its clients were not subject to any 
privilege and were therefore discoverable.64   
While divorce financing firms have not proven to be as harmful as 
previously feared, their near-disappearance calls into question the 
sustainability and ethics of the industry.  The website for BBL Churchill is 
 
 57. Paul Sullivan, Divorce Funding Firms Help Spouses Expecting Big Payouts,  N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/your-money/divorce-fund 
ing-firms-help-spouses-expecting-big-payouts.html [https://perma.cc/S62A-D3LV]; Julia 
Marsh, New York’s Divorce ‘Fixer’ Helps Soon-to-Be Ex-Wives Fight for Big Settlements, 
N.Y. POST (July 8, 2013), https://nypost.com/2013/07/ 08/new-yorks-divorce-fixer-helps-
soon-to-be-ex-wives-fight-for-big-settlements/ [https:// perma.cc/YKC9-NS7Z]. 
 58. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 28; White, supra note 21, at 401; 
Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21, at 1274. 
 59. Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21, at 1281. 
 60. Id. at 1282. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Our Approach, BALANCE POINT FUNDING, LLC, http://www.balancepoint 
funding.com/approach.html [https://perma.cc/SYX5-APY7]. 
 63. For Attorneys, supra note 56. 
 64. Cohen v. Cohen, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21319 at 16 (S.D.N.Y. January 30, 2015). 
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no longer functional,65 social media activity ended in 2016,66 and phone 
calls to the company were not returned at time of publication.67  Balance 
Point Funding’s website is still in operation, but emails to the listed 
addresses were undeliverable and the phone number was out of service.  
New Chapter Capital appears to be the only divorce financier still in 
business.68  While the industry has not proven particularly successful in the 
long run, the rise of divorce financiers is an important indicator for the legal 
profession.  Their business model required divorcing clients with 
entitlements to marital property but without the means to pay for a strong 
attorney.  Unilateral control of marital assets can handicap divorce 
proceedings for people of any level of wealth.69 
IV. COURT-MANDATED ATTORNEY’S FEES 
Court-mandated fee shifting has been posited as the legal mechanism 
to facilitate equitable access to representation in divorces.70  Ordinarily, the 
U.S. holds parties to litigation responsible for their own legal fees, absent 
a statutory or contractual exception.71  Court-mandated fee shifting is a 
common statutory exception,72 and usually entails awarding fees and costs 
to the prevailing party at the conclusion of litigation.73  However, awarding 
attorney’s fees at the end of a divorce does not help spouses with limited 
assets.  The aforementioned ethical codes prevent attorneys from entering 
into contingency fee agreements for domestic matters resulting in financial 
settlements.74  Even legal clinics may require some payment at the time of 
service. Disadvantaged spouses would still need the financial resources to 
hire a lawyer and pay them during the divorce proceedings.  
 
 65. “GoDaddy Domain,” BBLCHURCHILL.COM, http://bblchurchill.com/?reqp=1&req 
r=Ml5jLt== [https://perma.cc/E9TC-M4P8]. 
 66. @BBLChurchill, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2016) https://twitter.com/BBLChurchill/ 
status/693117681138946048 
 67. Despite multiple attempts, the author was unable to reach BBL Churchill for 
comment. 
 68. Telephone Interview with Nicole Noonan, CEO, New Chapter Capital (Mar. 2, 
2018).  Ms. Noonan confirmed that Balance Point Funding, LLC and BBL Churchill were 
no longer in operation, and she was not aware of any other divorce financing firms.  
 69. See supra Part II(A). 
 70. See White, supra note 21, at 398; Metsch-Garcia, supra note 21. 
 71. Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association v. Sunstate Equipment Company, LLC, 
405 P.3d 320, 346 (2006); Town of Milton Bd. of Health v. Brisson, 202 Vt. 121, 132 
(2016); Gilbert v. Master Washer & Stamping Co., Inc., 87 Cal. App. 4th 212, 216 (2001); 
Stewart Douglas Hendrix,”Better You Than Me:” Shifting Attorney’s Fees in Divorce 
Actions, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 671, 672 (1995-1996). 
 72. Jan Maiden, Winning By Financial Attrition: A Study of Attorney Fees Under 
California Family Code Sections 2030 and 2032, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 311, 314 (2001).  
 73. See generally 38 A.L.R.3d 1384 (2019); 35 A.L.R.4th 12 (2019); 118 A.L.R. Fed. 
1 (2019); 119 A.L.R. Fed. 433 (2019). 
 74. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 28. 
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Fortunately, courts and legislators have long recognized this problem 
with post-verdict attorney’s fees.75  As far back as the late nineteenth 
century, courts would order the husband, who under common law 
controlled the marital assets, to provide funds to his wife at the outset of 
court proceedings so that she could adequately litigate the divorce.76 This 
era of male control meant that married men were almost always ordered to 
pay for their wives divorce attorneys.77  As women gained social, political, 
and financial independence within the marital unit and in society as a 
whole, these fee shifting provisions began to change.78  States responded 
by individually evaluating the property ownership and assets of divorcing 
spouses petitioning for attorney’s fees.79  Statutes and court rules were 
enacted to authorize the courts to order the financially controlling spouse 
to pay for the litigation fees of the other.80   
Today, all fifty states have a method for financially disadvantaged 
spouses to access attorney’s fees before or during dissolution.81  Spouses 
lacking economic parity often receive inferior legal representation.82 This 
can have a serious impact on the spouses who are “poor and primary 
caregivers,” who also are predominantly women.83  The fee award is 
intended to place both spouses on equal footing and allow them to litigate 
with similar strength and resources.84  Ordering one spouse to pay the 
other’s legal fees has the additional benefit of discouraging the 
economically advantaged spouse from over-litigating minor issues,85 or 
drawing out proceedings to drain the other’s resources.86  Instead, the 
paying spouse may be motivated to behave fairly, collaborate, or 
compromise.87  These mechanisms have been called temporary attorney’s 
fees, interim counsel fees, or pendente lite alimony.88  Along with the 
 
 75. Ex parte Winter, 70 Cal. 291, 292 (1886).  
 76. Hendrix, supra note 71, at 672; see generally Ex parte Winter, 70 Cal. at 292; Mudd 
v. Mudd, 98 Cal. 320 (1893); Loveren v. Loveren, 100 Cal. 493 (1893); Lacey v. Lacey, 
108 Cal. 45 (1895); Beadleston v. Beadleston, 103 N.Y. 402 (1886); McBride v. McBride, 
8 N.Y.S. 448 (1890); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 137 N.Y. 500 (1893); Poillon v. Poillon, 75 
A.D. 536 (1902); Herrman v. Herrman, 88 A.D. 76 (1903). 
 77. Hendrix, supra note 71, at 672.  
 78. Id. at 691. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Maiden, supra note 72, at 314. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Maiden, supra note 72, at 324; O’Shea v. O’Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 190 (1999).  
 83. Maiden, supra note 72, at 324.  See also supra Part I. 
 84. See K.C. v. J.C. 25 N.Y.S.3d 798 (2015); Bieler v. Bieler 130 Colo. 17, 19 (1954). 
 85. Maiden, supra note 72, at 330. 
 86. Crocker C. v. Anne R. 28 N.Y.S.3d 286 (2016). 
 87. O’Shea v. O’Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 193 (Court of Appeals 1999). 
 88. See generally D.C. CODE § 16-911(a) (“During the pendency of an action for legal 
separation, divorce, [or[ the termination of a domestic partnership … the court may require 
the spouse or domestic partner to pay pendente lite alimony to the other spouse or domestic 
partner.”), FLA. STAT. § 61.16(1) (“The trial court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
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variation in terminology, jurisdictions vary in how they evaluate the 
financial situation of the spouses, and whether fee shifting is required for 
parity and justice.89  
V. A COMPARISON OF PENDENTE LITE ATTORNEY’S 
FEES IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK 
States handle pendente lite divorce fees in a variety of ways.  Some 
restrict the payments to attorney’s fees, while others include expert 
witnesses, accountants, and other professionals.90  States like Alabama, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire do not have statutory authority for fee 
shifting but have inferred the authority from other statutes and thus created 
the precedent for such authority.91  California has some statutory factors 
that allow a large degree of judicial discretion in determining whether 
temporary fees should be awarded.92  New York, in contrast, recently 
shifted away from the nebulous “as justice requires” standard to create a 
rebuttable presumption of fee shifting to the financially advantaged 
parties.93  While both systems have their proponents and detractors, New 
York’s laws appear to be more likely to facilitate actual parity between 
divorcing parties and discourage financially abusive litigation strategies. 
A. California, a Community Property State 
The purpose of community property systems is to recognize that 
spousal labor “contributes to the acquisition of family wealth.”94  In 
community property jurisdictions like California, married people form a 
legal partnership and property acquired during the marriage by the labor of 
either spouse belongs equally to both.95  This jointly owned property is 
called community property.96  Each spouse has a fully vested one-half 
interest in each community property asset from the moment of 
acquisition.97  Spouses can also have separate property, which belongs to 
only one of them.98  Separate property is generally property owned prior to 
 
temporary attorney’s fees and costs awards reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an 
appeal on the same basis and criteria as though the matter were pending before it at the trial 
level.”), 13 DEL. C. § 1512(a) (“The Court may award interim alimony to a dependent party 
during the pendency of an action for divorce or annulment.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally Hendrix, supra note 71. 
 91. Hendrix, supra note 71, at 688. 
 92. Id. at 683. 
 93. Id. at 687; N.Y. CLS Dom. Rel. §237(a) (LexisNexis 2020).  
 94. JO CARRILLO, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL, 12 (4th ed. 2018). 
 95. 11 Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (11th) Cmty. Prop. § 1. 
 96. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 98. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (LexisNexis 2019). 
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marriage, acquired by gift or inheritance, and any income and profits from 
separate property.99   
The characterization of property as either community or separate is 
crucial in marital dissolutions, because community property is jointly 
owned.100  Spouses are free to divide assets as they see fit in a marital 
contract or in divorce settlement negotiations.101  However, if they are 
unable to reach an agreement, the court must divide community property 
equally between spouses.102   
1. The Statutory Requirements for Pendente Lite Attorney’s Fees in 
California 
While California prefers that marital dissolutions be settled out of 
court, many divorces become adversarial proceedings.103 Spouses 
frequently find themselves on unequal financial footing at the point of 
dissolution in spite of community property laws.104  This disparity is often 
due to one spouse’s management and control of the marital finances, 
unequal division of domestic labor, and differences in employment and 
income before and during marriage.105  The characterization of property as 
community or separate and subsequent division of community property is 
often hotly contested in divorce litigation.106  The mere existence of this 
vested property interest is not sufficient for divorcing partners to have 
economic parity and access to comparable counsel.   
To ensure that both parties have access to representation regardless of 
who had actual control of the marital finances, California enacted Family 
Code sections 2030 and 2032.  Section 2030(a) states: 
 
In a proceeding for dissolution [or] nullity of marriage, or 
legal separation of the parties … the court shall ensure that each 
party has access to legal representation, including access early 
in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, 
if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one 
party … to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, 
whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and 
for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during 
the pendency of the proceeding. 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. 11 Witkin Summary pf Cal. Law (11th) Cmty. Prop. § 6. 
 101. In re Marriage of Cream, 13 Cal. App. 4th 81, 87 (1993). 
 102. Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 103. CAL FAM. CODE § 2013 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 104. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 105. See supra Part I. 
 106. See generally CARRILLO, supra note 94, at 281–381; Peter M. Moldave, The 
Division of the Family Residence Acquired with a Mixture of Separate and Community 
Funds, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1263-64 (1982). 
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Section 2032 adds: 
 
(a) The court may make an award of attorney’s fees and 
costs under Section 2030…where the making of the award, and 
the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the 
relative circumstances of the respective parties. 
(b) In determining what is just and reasonable under the 
relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration 
the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent 
practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the 
party’s case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent 
relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described 
in Section 4320.107 The fact that the party requesting an award 
of attorney’s fees and costs has resources from which the party 
could pay the party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself 
a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees 
and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for 
the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall 
cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their 
relative circumstances.108 
 
These statutes authorize the court to order the economically advantaged 
spouse to pay reasonable counsel fees necessary for the other party to 
maintain or defend against a divorce proceeding.109  However, in practice, 
the statutes do not guarantee that the disadvantaged spouse will receive the 
fees necessary to afford legal representation.110  Despite the laudable 
legislative intentions, the imprecise standards of fee shifting means that 
many spouses are not able to get the assistance they require.  
In order to award temporary attorney’s fees under California Family 
Code sections 2030 and 2032, the court must find that the requesting spouse 
needs financial assistance to support the divorce action, the awarded fees 
are just and reasonable, and the other spouse is able to pay the fees in 
addition to their own.111  When a spouse requests temporary fees, the court 
begins with a “needs assessment.”112  It compares the relative assets and 
obligations of the spouses to determine whether the requesting spouse 
 
 107. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (LexisNexis 2019) (specifying the factors to be considered 
in awarding spousal support). 
 108. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 109. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030 (LexisNexis 2019); id. 
 110. Maiden supra note 72, at 324. 
 111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030 (LexisNexis 2019); CAL. FAM. CODE §2032(a) 
(LexisNexis 2019). 
 112. CAL. FAM. CODE §2030(a) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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requires additional resources to acquire robust legal representation for the 
divorce proceeding.113  The relevant statutes give broad judicial discretion 
to determine whether a spouse is in need, with two primary limitations.  
First, the statute requires that spousal and child support not be considered 
in determining whether a party can afford the costs of divorce litigation.114  
The purpose of these support payments is to pay for the living expenses of 
the economically disadvantaged spouse and their dependent children,115  
and it would therefore be unjust to expect a person to use those resources 
to finance the divorce proceedings. Second, the court cannot require the 
requesting spouse to completely exhaust their own resources in order to be 
considered in need.116  The laws specify that “disparity in access and ability 
to pay” are the preconditions for an award of attorney’s fees,117 and having 
assets that could be used to pay for a lawyer is not a complete bar to 
receiving an additional fee award.118  For example, a husband with 
$2,000,000 in assets compared to his wife’s $40,000,000 was awarded 
$700,000 in attorney’s fees.119  This standard ensures that when one 
spouse’s assets pale in comparison to the others, the spouse with less can 
still receive pendente lite fees to allow them to litigate the divorce on equal 
footing. 
The fees awarded to the spouse in need must be just and reasonable.120  
Fees cannot be based on the economically advantaged spouse’s own legal 
costs.121  Instead, the court weighs the need of the requesting spouse and 
the relevant aspects of the divorce proceedings to determine what fees are 
reasonably necessary.  The complexity, nature, and difficulty of the divorce 
are the primary factors in determining reasonableness.122  A contested 
divorce that involves extensive assets, disputes over custody, division of 
closely-held businesses, or tracing of intermingled funds generally involves 
more discovery and expert witnesses than divorces without complex issues 
of fact or law, and would therefore reasonably require a larger award of 
interim fees.123  The difficulty of a divorce can be exacerbated by a party’s 
noncooperation, over-litigation, failure to make necessary disclosures, and 
other tactics designed to impede or draw out litigation.124  Courts may 
 
 113. CAL. FAM. CODE §2032(b) (LexisNexis 2019); In re Marriage of Kelso, 67 Cal. 
App. 4th 374, 385 (1998). 
 114. In re Marriage of Hatch, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1213, 1220 (1985). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Maiden supra note 72, at 317. 
 117. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 118. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032(b) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 119. In re Marriage of O’Connor, 59 Cal. App. 4th 877, 880-81 (1997). 
 120. CAL. FAM. CODE §2032 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 121. In re Marriage of Keech, 75 Cal. App. 4th 860, 869 (1999). 
 122. Id.; Maiden, supra note 72, at 320. 
 123. See generally CARRILLO, supra note 94, at 505-06. 
 124. Maiden, supra note 72, at 320. 
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determine the reasonableness of awards in light of such actions.125  For 
example, in a case where the husband evaded service for over two years 
and then filed for divorce in the Isle of Jersey to force his wife to incur 
exorbitant legal fees, the court found that an award of $750,000 was 
reasonable and just.126  Courts have also reduced or denied awards of 
attorney’s fees when the requesting spouses are found responsible for 
causing difficulty.127  This discretionary factor could be a saving grace in 
contentious divorces where the financially advantaged spouse attempts to 
use their superior resources to the detriment of the disadvantaged spouse. 
The third prong in awarding attorney’s fees is determining that the 
economically advantaged spouse has the ability to pay the award in addition 
to their own attorney’s fees.128  It would be an abuse of discretion for a court 
to order a party to pay an award to their spouse that they could not afford, 
even when the spouse has a demonstrable need.129  The primary means of 
determining the ability to pay is to consider the circumstances outlined in 
California Family Code section 4320.130  These include the earning capacity 
of the spouses, their standard of living, the parties’ financial obligations, 
and the role of the requesting spouse in facilitating the academic and 
professional advancement of the other spouse.131  However, these factors 
are only applied “to the extent relevant,” and the court may consider other 
factors that it finds pertinent to the inquiry.132   
2. The Impact of Judicial Discretion 
Trial courts “enjoy broad discretion” in awarding fees in marital 
dissolutions.133  However, this discretion cannot be arbitrary and 
capricious, and instead must be guided by legal principles to effectuate the 
purpose of the law and promote justice.134  A trial court’s decision to award 
or deny fees can only be overturned when the decision is so unreasonable 
that it is found to be an abuse of discretion.135  Furthermore, California 
courts are required to consider the statutory factors outlined in sections 
2030 and 2032, and failure to do so also constitutes an abuse of judicial 
discretion.136  But when the statutory factors are imprecise and vague, 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. In re Marriage of Kozen, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1265 (1986). 
 127. In re Marriage of Huntington, 10 Cal. App. 4th 151, 1524 (1992). 
 128. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030(a) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 129. In re Marriage of Keech, 75 Cal. App. 4th 860, 869 (1999) 
 130. In re Marriage of Ciprari, 32 Cal. App. 5th 83, 111 (2019). 
 131. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 132. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2032 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 133. In re Marriage of Cheriton, 92 Cal. App. 4th 269, 314 (2001). 
 134. In re Marriage of Jovel, 49 Cal. App. 4th 575, 587 (1996). 
 135. Id. at 587–88. 
 136. See In re Marriage of Tharp, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1313-14 (2010) (finding that 
the trial court’s failure to make a needs-based analysis before denying attorney fees was an 
abuse of discretion); In re Marriage of Braud 45 Cal. App. 4th 797, 827 (1996) (finding that 
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spouses requesting temporary fees see inconsistent and unpredictable 
results.137 
The nebulous statutory language and dearth of objective criteria in 
determining whether to award temporary attorney’s fees was likely 
intended to afford the courts flexibility and discretion in delicate and fact-
intensive family law matters.  However, the result is that trial courts issue 
unreliable awards.138  When pendente lite fees are not consistently granted, 
attorneys cannot rely on receiving payment, and therefore are likely to be 
less willing to take underfunded spouses as clients.  This creates a barrier 
for economically disadvantaged spouses to hire representation and properly 
litigate the divorce, which is contrary to the legislative intent behind these 
fee shifting provisions.139 
While the California legislature’s good intentions are obvious, the 
unintended contrary outcome in application of interim attorney’s fees 
leaves a number of divorcing spouses in a vulnerable position where they 
are unable to afford competent representation. This perpetuates the cycle of 
unfavorable divorce outcomes for people with fewer resources than their 
spouse.140 
B. New York, An Equitable Division State 
The practice of equitable division applies community property 
principles to civil property jurisdictions upon the dissolution of a 
marriage.141  All property acquired during marriage is considered marital 
property, although it is separately owned by the titled spouse until the 
marriage ends by death or dissolution.142  Similar to the community 
property system, marital property is subject to division between spouses 
during divorce, while separate property is retained by the owning spouse.143  
However, while community property is divided equally between spouses, 
 
the trial court abused discretion by failing to consider the disproportionate assets before 
awarding the wife a small percentage of the requested attorney fees). 
 137. Maiden, supra note 72, at 326. 
 138. Id. at 324. 
 139. 2010 Cal ALS 352, 2010 Cal AB 939, 2010 Cal Stats. ch. 352 (“Faced with 
crowded family law calendars and the rising numbers of self-represented litigants, as over 
70 percent of litigants in family law are unrepresented, many courts have adopted local rules 
and procedures in an attempt to more efficiently process the high volume of family law 
cases. While some of these rules and procedures have been innovative, others have created 
barriers to litigants getting their day in court, particularly litigants who are unrepresented. 
These barriers include drastically reducing live testimony in family law, which the 
California Supreme Court found, in its landmark decision Elkins v. Superior Court, 41 
Cal.4th 1337 (2007), deprives family law litigants of due process protections. Access to 
justice requires that parties be able to appropriately address the court and present their 
cases.”). 
 140. See supra Part I.  
 141. CARRILLO, supra note 94, at 102. 
 142. N.Y. CLS Dom Rel § 236(b) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 143. 48A NY Jur Domestic Relations § 2709. 
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marital property is divided equitably.144  The court considers factors such 
as the current and future financial circumstances of the spouses, the length 
of the marriage, contributions to a spouse’s career potential, and the 
custodial spouse’s interest in the marital residence when dividing what 
percentage of which assets would be fair and just for each spouse to 
receive.145  If both spouses contribute equally to a marriage, an equitable 
division would be as equal in value as possible.146  While this often means 
awarding spouses sole ownership of different assets of comparable value, 
it also can be met by absolving one spouse of a marital debt.  In a case 
where the primary marital asset was a home encumbered by a substantial 
mortgage, it was equitable to award the wife sole ownership because she 
also became solely responsible for the repayment of the mortgage.147  
Additionally, if a spouse does not contribute to the joint marital assets, 
either by not working or by keeping their assets wholly separate, the court 
could refuse to award them any interest in marital property.148 
Equitable dissolution creates much more uncertainty in the potential 
division of property upon divorce due to the fact-intense inquiry into 
whether each spouse has earned a portion of the marital assets. Unlike a 
community property jurisdiction, the non-titled divorcing spouse does not 
have a vested interest in any marital property, so the basis for fee shifting 
is not tied to the idea of an existing property right. Instead, the state has 
recognized the financial imbalance that the marital ownership system has 
created and provides a resource to navigate dissolution more fairly. 
A. The Statutory Requirements for Pendente Lite Attorney’s Fees in 
New York 
New York courts have shifted attorney’s fees in divorce actions since 
the late nineteenth century.149  The practice is currently codified in 
Domestic Relations Law section 237, which states,  
In any action or proceeding brought … for a divorce … the court may 
direct either spouse … to pay such sum or sums of money directly to the 
attorney of the other spouse to enable that spouse to carry on or defend the 
action or proceeding as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having 
 
 144. Giokas v Giokas, 73 A.D.3d 688, 689 (2010) (“While the distribution of marital 
property must be equitable, there is no requirement that the assets be split evenly.”). 
 145. N.Y. CLS Dom Rel § 236(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 146. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 A.D.3d 702, 703 (2009); cf. Puglisi v. Puglisi, 16 A.D.3d 
477, 477 (2nd Dept., 2005) (awarding the wife’s pension solely to her and the Cape Cod 
home solely to the husband due to the “separate economic existences” during their 
marriage). 
 147. Taylor v Taylor, 140 A.D.3d 944, 946 (2016). 
 148. Alper v Alper, 77 A.D.3d 694, 696 (Second 2010) (finding that the wife made little 
to no contribution to the marital assets, as she spent all her income on herself and her child 
from a prior marriage, and therefore was not entitled to a share of any marital assets). 
 149. Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N.Y. 134, 140-41 (Court of Appeals 1872). 
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regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.  There 
shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the 
less monied spouse.  In exercising the court’s discretion, the court shall 
seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that 
where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded … 
pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the 
commencement of the proceeding.150   
This replaced New York Civil Practice Act section 1169 and eliminated 
the requirement that the requesting spouse prove their financial need to 
receive temporary counsel fees.151  The purpose of the new law was to 
enable a “financially disabled spouse” to properly litigate a divorce 
proceeding.152  However, the law initially still required that the requesting 
spouse prove that “justice requires” the award.153  In 2010, the legislature 
added the rebuttable presumption that “the less monied spouse” would be 
awarded pendente lite fees.154  The purpose of this change was to remove 
the burden of proof from the economically disadvantaged spouse and 
instead place it on the one with superior resources.155 
Determining which spouse is less monied and if the presumption has 
successfully been rebutted still requires a “review [of the] financial 
circumstances of both parties together with the circumstances of the case.156  
The judicial procedure for awarding pendente lite counsel fees is outlined 
in the New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations.157  Of note, the regulations 
require that the spouses have a preliminary conference in which they 
exchange statements of net worth, paycheck stubs, state and federal income 
tax returns, life insurance policies, and other financial documents.158  The 
less monied spouse’s attorney must provide an affidavit detailing the hourly 
rates of the attorney and any anticipated experts.159  If unrepresented by 
 
 150. N.Y. CLS Dom. Rel. §237(a). 
 151. 3 NYCP: MA §34.06(e); De Cabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881 
(1987); see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 213 A.D.2d 183, 183-84 (1995). 
 152. Ravel v. Ravel, 161 A.D.2d 547, 550 (1990); see also Kaufman v. Kaufman, 131 
A.D.3d 939, 944-45 (2015) (finding that a court may award temporary attorney fees to a 
nonmonied spouses if there is significant financial disparity between them); cf. Ranieri v. 
Ranieri, 146 A.D.2d 34, 47 (App. Div. 1989) (finding that the court should have denied an 
award of interim counsel fees because the requesting spouse has sufficient independent 
means to pay for an attorney). 
 153. Sponsor Memo. (D. Weinstein) A.7569A, 233d Leg. (NY 2010). 
 154. N.Y. CLS Dom. Rel. §237(a). 
 155. Sponsor Memo. (D. Weinstein) A.7569A, 233d Leg. (NY 2010). 
 156. Id. 
 157. 22 NYCRR § 202.16 (2019) (“This section shall be applicable to all contested 
actions and proceedings … in which a judicial determination may be made with respect to 
alimony, counsel fees pendente lite, maintenance, custody and visitation, child support, or 
the equitable distribution of property.”). 
 158. Id. § 202.16(f). 
 159. Id. § 202.16(k). 
  
Summer 2020] “I CAN’T AFFORD TO LEAVE HIM” 255 
counsel, the requesting spouse must prove that they cannot afford 
representation.160  Failure to meet the disclosure requirements can lead to a 
denial of the requested fees.161   
B. The Impact of Judicial Discretion 
Just like in California, New York trial courts are afforded broad 
discretion when awarding temporary attorney’s fees, and appellate courts 
still generally defer to a trial court’s discretion.162 However, the procedures 
created by the statutes and regulations provide fairly clear guidelines and 
streamlines the process of requesting and receiving the necessary pendente 
lite fees.  The courts have held that the presumption of awarding attorney’s 
fees to the economically disadvantaged spouse is rebutted by simply 
showing that the spouse does not in fact have inferior financial resources.  
In a recent case, the court upheld a $3,000 award of temporary attorney’s 
fees to the wife when, after paying taxes and court-ordered maintenance 
fees, the husband’s annual net worth was only $9,000 more than the 
wife’s.163  The court found that despite the small disparity between their 
liquid assets, the husband had not successfully rebutted the presumption 
that she was less monied and was therefore entitled to pendente lite fees.164  
In a contrary case, the court found that a wife’s accumulations of thousands 
of dollars of savings while receiving maintenance payments and also 
working a well-compensated job put her on comparable financial grounds 
to her husband and therefore rebutted the presumption that she was entitled 
to additional pendente lite counsel fees as the less monied spouse.165  
Therefore, a simple comparison of the parties’ respective assets is sufficient 
to determine which party is eligible for attorney’s fees. Additionally, the 
list of financial documents the parties are required to disclose in the 
preliminary conference eliminate the need for costly discovery and provide 
the court with a clear “apples-to-apples” comparison.166  
The standards established by the pendente lite presumption is beneficial 
to both spouses with limited financial resources and the attorneys who 
represent them.  It creates more predictability for whether a requesting 
spouse may receive the award, and it allows attorneys to engage with poorer 
clients with the understanding that the court will ensure that the attorneys 
will be fairly compensated for their work.  In determining the amounts of 
the awards, the courts retain more discretion when considering the 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Hughes v. Hughes, 208 A.D.2d 502, 502 (Second Dept. 1994) (finding that the wife 
was not entitled to pendente lite fees because the affidavit provided by her counsel did not 
include time records or information regarding the work performed to date). 
 162. 3 NYCP: MA 34.06[h]. 
 163. E.J.L. v. K.L.L., 38 Misc. 3d 389, 406 (2012). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 145 A.D.3d 1295, 1298 (2016). 
 166. 22 NYCRR § 202.16(f) (March 29, 2019). 
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complexity of the case and the behavior of the parties.167  Awards can be 
altered as a consequence for a party’s behavior.  In one case, the husband 
engaged in protracted litigation, obstructed discovery, and moved to 
exclude his ex-wife from the tennis club where they were both members.168  
In light of his behavior, the appellate court increased the amount of the 
award to the wife from $20,000 to $90,000 in attorney’s fees.169  In another 
case, the court ordered counsel fees to be paid out of a husband’s separate 
property rather than the marital assets where he attempted to abuse his 
spouse financially and emotionally through scorched-earth litigation 
tactics.170  These factors ensure that both parties in the divorce have a 
clearer understanding of the possible outcomes when courts order pendente 
lite fees.  
VI.   A CALL FOR MEASURED JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
The key distinction in the application of pendente lite attorney’s fees in 
California and New York is that California’s statutory factors offer the trial 
court a significant amount of judicial discretion, while New York’s 
rebuttable presumption of need significantly limits it.  When trial courts 
weigh imprecise and potentially extensive factors to determine if a 
requesting spouse has sufficient need, they are being asked to determine 
“the parties’ past conduct, present needs, and future life circumstances.”171  
Family law, particularly divorce cases, give trial courts more discretion 
than any other field of private law.172  This can lead to unpredictable results, 
where outcomes appear to diverge from the stated standards.173 
Judicial discretion can be very beneficial.  It allows for nuanced 
decisions that consider the individual circumstances of the parties, and it 
can adapt more easily as justice requires.  However, the flexibility comes 
at a fairly high cost.  When a legal standard is not easily discernable, it 
impedes pro se litigants and less experienced counsel from discerning its 
meaning and significance to the case, and generally requires legal 
expertise—and the accompanying billable hours—to distill into a rule.174  
The degree of discretion creates a barrier to justice for those who cannot 
afford legal representation in their divorce and allows those with superior 
resources to exploit their former partner.  These overall costs may be too 
great to continue with the current degree of judicial discretion. 
 
 167. Macaluso, 145 A.D.3d at 1298. 
 168. Culen v. Culen, 157 A.D.3d 930, 933 (2018). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Schussler v. Schussler, 109 A.D.2d 875, 877-878 (1985). 
 171. Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis 
of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 409-10 (1996). 
 172. Id. at 411. 
 173. Id. at 506. 
 174. Id. at 516.  
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When authorizing pendente lite counsel fees, legislatures should seek 
to establish moderate rules that create consistent outcomes.  New York’s 
rebuttable presumption is a model statute that blends clearly delineated 
standards with limited judicial discretion.  It allows both divorcing spouses 
and their attorneys a in which to predict whether they might receive interim 
fees, and the discretion allows judges to adapt the amount for the needs, 
complexity, and behaviors specific to the case. 
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